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SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Practice and Procedure
I. NEW TRIAL NisI STANDARD CLARIFIED
In two recent cases, the South Carolina Supreme Court clarified the
standards of law in decisions on new trials nisi. O'Neal v. Bowlest and
Allstate Insurance Co. v. Durham2 allowed the court to reiterate the guidelines
for trial judges as well as the standard of review for new trial nisi decisions.
The court did so in the tandem decisions, upholding the trial judge's decision
on new trial nisi in one case while reversing the trial bench in the other.
4
In O'Neal the court held that "[t]he trial judge alone has the power to
grant a new trial nisi when he finds the amount of the verdict to be merely
inadequate or excessive." 5 The court held also that when the verdict amount
is so grossly inadequate or excessive as to show that "passion, caprice,
prejudice, or some other influence outside the evidence" motivated the jury,
the trial judge must grant a new trial absolute.' The trial judge abuses
discretion by failing to do so, and the appeals court must grant a new trial
absolute' O'Neal expressly overruled three state supreme court decisions'
and five South Carolina Court of Appeals decisions9 that were inconsistent
with O'Neal. In Durham the court relied upon O'Neal, reiterating the
standards set forth in that case.
In O'Neal Daniel O'Neal broke his ankle in a March 1987 motorcycle
accident. Dr. Robert Bowles performed the operation repairing the leg.
1. __ S.C. -, 431 S.E.2d 555 (1993).
2. __ S.C. __, 431 S.E.2d 557 (1993).
3. O'Neal, _ S.C. at _, 431 S.E.2d at 555.
4. Durham, __ S.C. at _, 431 S.E.2d at 557.
5. O'Neal, - S.C. at _, 431 S.E.2d at 556 (citing Easler v. Hejaz Temple A.A.O.N.M.-
S., 285 S.C. 348, 329 S.E.2d 753 (1985).
6. Id. at__, 431 S.E.2d at 556.
7. Id. at _, 431 S.E.2d at 556 (citing Mickle v. Blackman, 252 S.C. 202, 166 S.E.2d 172
(1969), aff'd after remand, 255 S.C. 136, 177 S.E.2d 548 (1970), and Zom v. Crawford, 252
S.C. 127, 165 S.E.2d 640 (1969)).
8. Reid v. Harbison Dev. Corp., 289 S.C. 319, 345 S.E.2d 492 (1986);Howard v. Holiday
Inns, Inc., 276 S.C. 502, 280 S.E.2d 204 (1981); Hutson v. Continental Assurance Co., 269
S.C. 322, 237 S.E.2d 375 (1977).
9. Williams v. Robertson Gilchrist Constr. Co., 301 S.C. 153, 390 S.E.2d 483 (Ct. App.
1990); Simmons v. Williamson, 300 S.C. 323, 387 S.E.2d 698 (Ct. App. 1989) (per curiam);
Bocook Outdoor Media, Inc. v. Summey Outdoor Advertising, Inc., 294 S.C. 169, 363 S.E.2d
390 (Ct. App. 1987); Jones v. Ingles Supermarkets, Inc., 293 S.C. 490, 361 S.E.2d 775 (Ct.
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During the operation, Dr. Bowles severed a nerve in O'Neal's leg, requiring
a second operation three months later to repair the severed nerve. O'Neal lost
his job as a lieutenant with the Sullivan's Island Police Department in July
1987 after using all of his sick leave and vacation while recuperating. After
an odyssey that took him to a technical school in Indiana, to a part-time job
as a mechanic at a filling station, and to an Indiana county where he served as
a volunteer deputy sheriff, the Sullivan's Island police rehired O'Neal as a
patrolman first class. The position was a much lower rank than the one O'Neal
formerly held. O'Neal sought $9,087.46 for medical expenses, $25,166 for
lost wages beginning in July 1987, $9,579 for diminished wages, and damages
for ten percent permanent impairment of his injured leg. 1 Instead of the
minimum $43,832.46 that O'Neal sought, the jury entered a verdict for
$12,500." The judge denied O'Neal's motion for new trial nisi additur.
The supreme court unanimously upheld the ruling.'"
In Durham the court reversed when an insurer appealed the denial of its
motion for new trial nisi. Allstate Insurance Company provided homeowners
insurance to Lawrence and Linda McReynolds. Randall Durham did some
plumbing work for the McReynolds in August 1988. In October 1988, a
water line installed by Durham separated from a lavatory while the McRey-
nolds were not home, flooding most of the house.'
3
Allstate paid $34,651.74 to repair the flooding damage and then sued
Durham for that amount, resting its claim partly on breach of implied
warranty. Durham counterclaimed, asserting that the McReynolds still owed
him $343 for plumbing services. The jury returned a verdict of $343 for
Durham on his counterclaim. Also, the jury awarded Allstate $160.20 on the
implied warranty action,' 4 which may have represented the estimated cost of
repairing the plumbing in the McReynolds' home.'5 The judge denied
Allstate's motion for a new trial nisi additur, and the supreme court unani-
mously reversed.' 6
In O'Neal the court re-established a standard for new trial nisi dating from
the early part of this century by using language appearing in a 1910 case, Bing
v. Atlantic Coast Line Railway Co. 7 However, the passion, prejudice, or
caprice doctrine has its roots in 19th century South Carolina cases.'8 The
10. O'Neal, __ S.C. at _, 431 S.E.2d at 556.
11. Id. at_, 431 S.E.2d at 556.
12. Id. at _, 431 S.E.2d at 557.
13. Durham, _ S.C. _, 431 S.E.2d at 558.
14. Id. at _, 431 S.E.2d at 558.
15. Id. at__ n.1, 431 S.E.2d at 558 n.1.
16. Id. at _, 431 S.E.2d at 558.
17. 86 S.C. 528, 68 S.E. 645 (1910)(per curiam). Bing is among the earliest of South
Carolina cases holding that a new trial is appropriate when a verdict is so excessive as to indicate
caprice, passion, or prejudice on the part of the jury.
18. South Carolina law has much earlier examples ofjudges refusing to grant a new trial when
1994]
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O'Neal court made it clear through its choice of authority that its intent was
exactly that: to re-establish what it considered a longstanding standard.' 9
While none of the four cases cited in O'Neal was more than 25 years old,2"
the court drew upon authority dating from 1916.21 Those cases and the line
of authority they represent provide not just the basis but even the language for
the holding in O'Neal.
As if to point out that courts in recent years have applied the proper
standard of review to new trial nisi decisions, O'Neal cites Easler, a 1985
case. In Easler the plaintiff suffered a permanent neck injury during a secret
society's hazing initiation ritual and was awarded $361,800. The court
stated that excessive verdicts fall into two categories, "those unduly liberal and
those actuated by passion, caprice or prejudice. "I The Easler court then set
forth as well-established the standard espoused by the O'Neal court:
Where the verdict is deemed excessive by the trial judge, in the sense that
it indicates merely undue liberality on the part of the jury, the trial judge
alone has the power, and with it the responsibility, of setting aside the
verdict absolutely or reducing it by the granting of a new trial nisi ....
It is only when the verdict is so grossly excessive and the amount awarded
so shockingly disproportionate to the injuries as to indicate that the jury
was moved or actuated by paision, caprice, prejudice, or other consider-
ation not found on the evidence that it becomes the duty of this court, as
well as of the trial court, to set aside the verdict absolutely.24
By means of Mickle, a 1969 decision, the O'Neal court showed the
lengthy line of authority supporting the standard it espoused. In Mickle, the
plaintiff suffered permanent injuries in an auto accident and was awarded
$750,000, at the time "probably the highest verdict in a personal injury case
in the history of this State."21 The state supreme court upheld the trial
judge's refusal to grant the defendant's motion for new trial nisi remittitur. In
they found the verdict excessive but believed the jury was within the bounds of the evidence. See
Morgan v. Livingston, 31 S.C.L. (2 Rich.) 573 (1846); Stott v. Ryan, 5 S.C.L. (3 Brev.) 417
(1814).
19. The O'Neal court cited four cases: Easier; Mickle; Zorn; and Boozer v. Boozer, 300 S.C.
282, 387 S.E.2d 674 (Ct. App. 1988) (per curiam). Each case used the new trial nisi standard
exactly as stated in O'Neal with little deviation even in the language used.
20. Decided January 22, 1969, Zorn was the oldest, coming less than three weeks before the
court's February 10, 1969 ruling in Mickle.
21. For its application of the new trial nisi standard, Mickle cites Steele v. Atlantic Coast Line
R., 103 S.C. 102, 87 S.E. 639 (1916).
22. Easier, 285 S.C. at 351, 329 S.E.2d at 755.
23. Id. at 356, 329 S.E.2d at 758.
24. Id. (citations omitted).
25. Mickle, 252 S.C. at 248, 166 S.E.2d at 195 (quoting the trial judge).
[Vol. 46
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affirming the trial judge's decision, the Mickle court cited a 1916 case for its
standard of review:
This court has no jurisdiction to review matters of fact in an action at law;
and, therefore, unless a verdict is wholly unsupported by evidence, or is
so excessive as to justify the inference that it was capricious, or influenced
by passion, prejudice, or other considerations not found in the evidence,
... the responsibility for failure to reduce it must rest upon the trial
judge.
26
The Mickle and Easier decisions address excessive verdicts, as does Zorn,
a case the O'Neal court cites as further support of the proposition offered in
Mickle. To prevent misunderstanding, the O'Neal court cited with favor
Boozer, which applied the same standard to inadequate verdicts:
The denial of a motion for a new trial absolute or a new trial nisi for
excessiveness of verdict is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial
judge. ... We have no power to review his ruling unless it rests on a
basis of fact wholly unsupported by the evidence or is controlled by an
error of law. Motions for a new trial based on inadequacy of verdict are
governed by the same principles as govern motions for a new trial based
on excessiveness of verdict. 27
Without deviation, the cases cited in O'Neal held that the "caprice,
prejudice, passion, or other improper considerations" standard of review
governs motions for a new trial; Boozer does so by incorporation, not stating
the standard explicitly but using as its authority Toole v. Toole28 which
employs the "caprice, passion or prejudice" standard. 29
Having re-established the standard in O'Neal, the court in Durham relied
on O'Neal and Easier as primary authorities. The Durham court cited Toole
in a footnote to make clear that the same standard applies to excessive and
inadequate verdicts.3" The Durham court then applied the O'Neal standard,
using virtually identical language and supplying emphasis in the same places
as O'Neal when stating "the trial judge alone has the power to reduce the
verdict by the granting of a new trial nisi" where the verdict is merely undtly
liberal or conservative.31
26. Id. at 251, 166 S.E.2d at 196 (quoting Bing, 103 S.C. at 117-18, 87 S.E. at 644)
(omission in original).
27. Boozer, 300 S.C. at 283, 387 S.E.2d at 675 (citations omitted).
28. 260 S.C. 235, 195 S.E.2d 389 (1973).
29. Id. at 239-40, 195 S.E.2d at 390-91.
30. See Durham, __ S.C. at _, 431 S.E.2d at 558 n.2.
31. Id. at _, 431 S.E.2d at 558.
19941
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Although the overruled decisions provided potential for confusion32 - that
both parties in both cases relied upon some of the overruled decisions is proof
of that - the standard of review for new trial nisi was in the law in cogent
form.3 3 The court handed down no real changes in the law;34 it simply took
steps to put a drifting judiciary back on a well-established course.35  Seven
of the eight cases overruled can be grouped as misapplying the standard of
review in one of two ways. The eighth is a rogue.
The problems apparently began in 1977 with Hutson. In that suit over the
payment of credit disability insurance, the supreme court itself ordered a
remittitur or, in the alternative, a new trial absolute. O'Neal and Durham state
that the decision invaded the province of the trial judge. The Hutson court
created a mix-and-match of new trial nisi and new trial absolute without
requiring any finding of caprice, passion, or prejudice before the appellate
court intervenes.36 In Hutson, the supreme court ordered an offer of
remittitur because of an error of law in the jury charge on damages. If the
plaintiff were unwilling to accept that, then the court would have to order a
new trial on all issues.
The decisions also overruled Howard for many of the same reasons as
Hutson: in Howard the supreme court also ordered a remittitur, with a new
trial on damages as an alternative. 31 Like Hutson, Howard invaded the trial
judge's discretionary province on new trial nisi. Reid likewise violated the
trial judge's discretionary powers. The Reid court overruled it because the
court reversed the trial judge's decision to grant new trial nisi, instead
ordering a new trial absolute, without finding that caprice, passion, or
prejudice motivated the verdict."
32. The confusion seems to have been more reality than mere potential. In O'Neal, attorneys
for O'Neal cited Jones and Simmons; counsel for Bowles cited Jones, Simmons, and Haskins. See
Final Brief of Appellant at 10; Final Brief of Respondent at 9, 11, 14-16. In Durham, Allstate's
attorneys also cited Haskins and Jones, while lawyers for Durham cited Jones and Hutson. See
Brief of Appellant at 7-8; Brief of Respondent at 8-9.
33. For instance, both parties in both cases also cited cases used favorably by the courts in
O'Neal and Durham. Durham's attorneys cited Toole, Mickle, and Boozer; counsel for Allstate
likewise cited Boozer and Mickle. See Brief of Appellant at 7-9, Brief of Respondent at 7; Reply
Brief of Appellant 9-4. Bowles' lawyers cited Toole, as did attorneys for O'Neal. See Final Brief
of Appellant at 8-9; Respondent at 10.
34. The court in O'Neal did not purport to make any changes in the law, stating that because
there was "inconsistent case law on this issue, we take this opportunity to set forth the correct
standard of review for an appeal of a motion for new trial nisi." O'Neal, - S.C. at _, 431
S.E.2d at 556.
35. As identified by the cases overruled in O'Neal, the drift that took courts away from the
proper standard occurred in the last 16 years or so, starting in 1977 with Hutson.
36. See Hutson, 269 S.C. at 333-34, 237 S.E.2d at 380.
37. Howard, 276 S.C. at 505, 280 S.E.2d at 205-6.
38. Reid, 289 S.C. at 322, 345 S.E.2d at 493. The court agreed with the trial judge that the
[Vol. 46
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In four other cases reversed by O'Neal,39 the courts misstated when the
trial judge may grant new trial nisi. In Haskins, the court used some of the
magic words referred to in Toole,40 even citing Toole as authority. Then the
court proceeded to misapply the standard of review:
A motion for a new trial may be granted in tort actions where the verdict
is grossly inadequate; such motions are addressed to the sound discretion
of the judge. The trial judge also has the power to grant a new trial nisi
additur when he finds the verdict so grossly inadequate as to be the result
of prejudice and passion or merely insufficient based on the evidence.41
Apparently, the Haskins court saw no conflict in giving the trial court
discretion to grant new trial nisi motions under virtually all circumstances
while reversing the trial judge for exercising that discretion by not granting a
motion for new trial nisi.42  The decisions in Simmons; Bocook Outdoor
Media, Inc.; and Jones were overruled because, like Haskins, all held that a
trial judge has the discretion to grant new trial nisi when the verdict is so
grossly inadequate as to be the result of passion and prejudice or merely
insufficient based on the evidence. 43 None of the courts clearly stated what
level of inadequacy, still greater than the standard on which they granted trial
judges discretion, sufficed to constitute an abuse of discretion.
The eighth case, Williams, is a rogue, fitting in neither of the categories
just discussed. The Williams court stated that a judge has the discretion to
grant new trial nisi "upon a finding that the verdict is so inadequate that it
must be determined to be the result of the jury's disregard of the facts or the
trial judge's instructions."I The court then muddied the waters further,
totally removing the caprice, passion, or prejudice standard from the equation:
We hold that in granting a motion for a new trial nisi additur it is not
necessary for the trial judge in so many words to say or write in his order
verdict was excessive, but where the court of appeals granted a new trial on actual damages only,
the supreme court reversed and remanded, ordering the trial judge to grant a new trial on actual
and punitive damages unless the plaintiffs agreed to a remittitur. Id. at 322-23, 345 S.E.2d at
493-94.
39. See supra note 9.
40. Toole, 260 S.C. at 239-40, 195 S.E.2d at 390-91. The Toole court stated that it could
review whether the verdict was so grossly inadequate as to indicate caprice, prejudice, or passion
on the part of the jury even though the appellant's attorney "did not use those magic words in
making his motion for new trial." Id. at 240, 135 S.E.2d at 391.
41. Haskins, 283 S.C. at 236, 321 S.E.2d at 190 (citations omitted).
42. See id.
43. See Bocook, 294 S.C. at 180, 363 S.E.2d at 396; Simmons, 300 S.C. at 328-29, 387
S.E.2d at 701; Jones, 293 S.C. at 493, 361 S.E.2d at 777.
44. Williams, 301 S.C. at 155, 390 S.E.2d at 484.
19941
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that the verdict was grossly inadequate. It is sufficient, in granting a
motion for a new trial nisi additur, that the trial judge verbalize his
conclusion that the jury in awarding damages disregarded the facts of the
case or the judge's instruction.' 5
In the eight cases overruled, the court attempted to correct a trend of
inconsistency in the review of new trial nisi decisions. Rather than relying on
precedent, courts were creating new standards, often with bits and pieces of
the O'Neal standard but usually some of the pieces did not quite fit.
The court clarified the standard of review but still failed to give
significant guidance on making the new trial nisi decision at the trial level--or
on appeal. While setting the standard at "passion, prejudice, or caprice," the
court gave no indication of how to tell passion from mere undue liberality.
Until the verdict amount reaches the magic passion, prejudice, or caprice
level, trial judges operate within their discretion, but the judges have no real
guidance as to where the bounds of that discretion lie. Apparently, the only
way for trial judges to know that they correctly ordered a new trial nisi motion
is to await appellate review.
This may make judges wary of entering the new trial nisi minefield, but
there probably is no other way to deal with the issue. It may be impossible
to set a standard. Establishing a mathematical formula runs the risk of being
insensitive to the infinite variety of fact patterns in which the new trial nisi
decision may arise. Because of that, the decision will remain fact-driven
depending on factors beyond the verdict amount.
The results in O'Neal and Durham are not revolutionary, but they clarify
a standard of review that was becoming fairly muddy in South Carolina law.
Nonetheless, rulings on new trial nisi will be ad hoc, gut-level calls by trial
judges. Like the explorers of old with maps marked "here be dragons" at the
edge of the known world, trial judges facing new trial nisi rulings will know
the edge is out there somewhere, but they will not know exactly where the
edge is, when they move from discretion to abuse, until an appeals court tells
them they fell off.
Patrick D. Farrington
II. COURT FURTHER EXAMINES PEREMPTORY STRIKES
In State v. Geddis' the South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the
conviction of Reginald Geddis. Geddis, a black man, challenged his
45. Id. at 156, 390 S.E.2d at 485.
1. _ S.C. _, 437 S.E.2d 31 (1993).
[Vol. 46
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conviction for criminal sexual conduct and kidnapping on the grounds that the
solicitor violated the United States Supreme Court's ruling in Batson v.
Kentucky2 by using peremptory challenges in a racially discriminatory
manner. 3 The Geddis ruling illustrates that the peremptory challenge retains
some viability in South Carolina. Although Batson limits the use of the
peremptory challenge, that limitation is not absolute.
During jury selection, the State used three of its peremptory challenges
to strike black panel members. When defense counsel objected, the trial judge
conducted a Batson hearing requiring the State to put forth racially neutral
explanations for its use of the strikes. The appeal centered around the removal
of Pamela Anderson, a twenty-three-year-old black woman.4 Although the
solicitor said that he struck Anderson to avoid putting young women on the
jury, the solicitor did not challenge two twenty-year-old white women. The
solicitor further explained that he saw the two white women watching the
proceedings the previous day, and their evident interest overcame his
reluctance to put them on the jury. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial
judge ruled that the solicitor's explanations were racially neutral.5
On appeal, the South Carolina Supreme Court followed the three-prong
inquiry adopted in State v. Green6 for analyzing Batson questions.7 In Green
the Court promulgated the following analysis:
First, the defendant must make a prima facie showing that the Solicitor
exercised such challenges on the basis of race. Second, if the requisite
showing is made, the burden shifts to the Solicitor to articulate a race-
neutral explanation for the strikes in question. Third, the trial court must
determine whether the defendant has met his burden of proving
purposeful discrimination.'
2. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
3. Geddis, - S.C. at _, 437 S.E.2d at 32.
4. Brief of Respondent at 3. The solicitor explained that he struck one black woman because
she had been arrested for assault and battery with intent to kill and was unemployed. The
solicitor then explained that he struck a black male because the man had several convictions for
petit larceny and shoplifting. Defense counsel essentially accepted these challenges and they are
not before the court on appeal. Id.
5. Geddis, __ S.C. at, 437 S.E.2d at 32. The trial judge himself noted one of the white
women, Ms. McFarland, watching an earlier trial. The trial judge considered that two black
women were seated, one after the defense counsel used all of its strikes and the State had strikes
remaining. In Respondent's Brief, the State points out that three black women were seated while
the State had remaining strikes. Brief of Respondent at 5.
6. 306 S.C. 94, 409 S.E.2d 785 (1991), cert. denied, _ U.S. _, 112 S. Ct. 1566 (1992).
7. See Geddis, _ S.C. at _, 437 S.E.2d at 32.
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The defendant made a prima facie showing when the solicitor used his strikes
against the black members of the panel. However, the majority found that the
solicitor did not distinguish sufficiently between the white women and the
black woman to account for the challenges made.' Further, the majority held
that the defendant did not meet his burden of proving purposeful discrimina-
tion, even after examining the surrounding circumstances."t
Justice Finney wrote a strong dissent in which Justice Toal joined. The
dissent began by examining the State's rationale for the strikes in light of
surrounding circumstances. Then the dissent argued that a facially race-neutral
reason may be rendered pretextual by selectively advancing that reason in a
racially motivated manner. Under this analysis, by failing to apply its reason
in a neutral manner the state invalidates its facially race-neutral reason. The
striking of the black woman without the striking of the white women was not
a neutral application of the race-neutral reason the State advanced. Further,
the dissenters distinguished Wilder because the State did not show actual
interest on the part of the women not struck in Geddis.1t In Wilder the white
woman who remained, even though she reported late for jury duty, stated to
the court that she was there to serve the court. 2 In Geddis the only evidence
that the white women had greater interest than the black woman was the
solicitor's testimony and the trial judge's finding that one of the women was
indeed present at a previous trial. The dissent stated that the solicitor's
attempt to ascribe relevant motives to the white women from their mere
presence at another trial did not constitute a race-neutral explanation.
Therefore, believing that the defendant had met his burden of proof, the
dissent would have reversed and remanded for a new trial.13
Geddis illustrates the division between two sets of desires of the court -
protection of the Sixth 4 and Seventh Amendments"' guarantee of trial by
an impartial jury and protection against invidious discrimination provided by
the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause.' Although the
9. Geddis, __ S.C. at _, 437 S.E.2d at 33. The court found State v. Wilder, 306 S.C.
535, 413 S.E.2d 323 (1991), dispositive. In Wilder, the State explained strikes against two
blacks on the grounds that they were late for court and that this tardiness signified a lack of
respect for the court. However, the State did not challenge a white woman who reported late.
The State explained that the woman's expressed desire to serve on the jury overcame the State's
concern over her lateness. The court found this distinction sufficient to overcome the Batson
challenge. See Wilder, 306 at 538, 413 S.E.2d 325.
10. Geddis, __ S.C. at _, 437 S.E.2d at 32-33.
11. Id. at_, 437 S.E.2d at 33-34 (Finney, J., dissenting).
12. Wilder, 306 S.C. at 536 n.2, 413 S.E.2d at 324 n.2.
13. Geddis, __ S.C. at _, 437 S.E.2d at 34 (Finney, J., dissenting).
14. U.S. CONST. am. VI.
15. U.S. CONST. am. VII.
16. U.S. CONST. am. XIV, § 1, cl. 2.
[Vol. 46
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Constitution does not guarantee the use of peremptory strikes, 17 courts long
have held their use as a significant device in ensuring the "Sixth Amendment's
guarantee of a fair and impartial jury.""8 Nonetheless, the court's desire to
protect against invidious discrimination conflicts occasionally with the
peremptory challenge.
A peremptory challenge may be used in a racially based manner, thus
allowing invidious discrimination to occur in the courtroom. Therefore, the
United States Supreme Court has limited the use of the peremptory chal-
lenge19 to protect parties in a suit from discrimination in the selection of
jurors' and to protect prospective jurors from being discriminated against.
21
Although the Supreme Court limited the use of the peremptory challenge, the
Court declined "to formulate particular procedures to be followed upon...
timely objection to . . . [peremptory] challenges."' Therefore, courts may
implement Batson in various ways.
In State v. Jones23 the South Carolina Supreme Court adopted a bright-
line test for when a court should hold a Batson hearing, stating:
In all future jury trials, therefore, we recommend that the trial court
hold a Batson hearing whenever 1) the defendant requests such a hearing;
2) the defendant is a member of a cognizable racial group; and 3) the
prosecutor exercises peremptory challenges to remove members of
defendant's race from the venire.
24
However, two United States Supreme Court decisions affected this bright-line
approach. In Powers v. Ohio7 the Court ruled that the defendant's race was
irrelevant in considering objections to peremptory challenges.26 This holding
obviated the requirements in the second and third prongs that the defendant be
a member of a cognizable racial group and the same race as the challenged
17. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 91 (1986) (citing Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202
(1965)).
18. Robert T. Prior, The Peremptory Challenge: A Lost Cause?, 44 MERCER L. REv. 579,
582 (1993).
19. See Georgia v. McCollum, _ U.S. _, 112 S.Ct. 2348 (1992) (applying Batson
peremptory strikes by a criminal defendant); Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614
(1991) (applying Batson in a civil case); Batson, 476 U.S. at 79.
20. See Prior, supra note 18, at 591 (quoting McCollum, - U.S. at -, 112 S. Ct. at 2353
(quoting Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 406 (1991)).
21. See id. (quoting McCollum, _ U.S. at _, 112 S. Ct. at 2353).
22. Batson, 476 U.S. at 99 (footnote omitted).
23. 293 S.C. 54, 358 S.E.2d 701 (1987).
24. Id. at 57-58, 358 S.E.2d at 703.
25. 499 U.S. 400 (1991) (holding that a white defendant could challenge the prosecution's use
of peremptory challenges to strike black venire members).
26. Id. at 416.
1994]
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jurors. Further, in Edmonson the Court applied Batson to civil litigation,
expanding the scope of Batson to all parties. Finally, the Supreme Court came
full circle in McCollum by extending the Batson requirement to a criminal
defendant.2 7 At present, no party to litigation can use peremptory strikes in
a racially motivated manner.
In Green the South Carolina Supreme Court promulgated its three-part
Batson analysis. Because a party can meet the prima facie threshold easily,
some have suggested that a party make a motion for a Batson hearing
whenever a peremptory strike is made "upon a member of a cognizable racial
group."2" During the hearing, if the challenger to the strikes shows a prima
facie case of discrimination and the striking party does not provide a rational
race-neutral reason, "the process of selecting the jury shall start de novo."29
On appeal, the proper remedy is to remand. 0
In Geddis the South Carolina Supreme Court merely followed the dictates
of Batson and its progeny. The trickiest question in Geddis is whether the
solicitor's assertion that the two young white women were interested because
they were present at another trial is a sufficiently race-neutral explanation for
their not being struck along with the young black woman. However, this
determination rests largely upon the trial judge's evaluation of the solicitor's
credibility. Therefore, the appellate court gives the trial judge's determination
"great deference." 31
Only if the record does not support the trial judge's determination will the
appellate courts overturn the finding. 2 In Geddis there was at least some
support for the solicitor's rationale for striking the black juror and not striking
the white jurors. The trial judge himself noted that one of the white jurors had
27. See Georgia v. McCollum, _ U.S. _, _, 112 S. Ct. 2348, 2359 (1992).
28. Tara S. Taggart, Case Note, Prosecutor Must Meet Heightened Burden in Demonstrating
Racially Neutral Explanation for Use of Peremptory Strikes, 44 S.C. L. REV. 25, 29 (1992). In
Hayes v. State 405 S.E.2d 660 (Ga. 1991), Justice Benham suggested:
Rather than deciding on a case by case basis whether a party is entitled to a hearing
based upon a primafacie showing of purposeful discrimination, the better course to
follow would be to hold a Batson hearing on any party's request whenever the other
party exercises peremptory challenges to remove members of a cognizable racial
group from the venire.
Id. at 669 (Benham, J. concurring). Justice Benham developed this approach from Jones. See
id. (Benham, J., concurring).
29. Jones, 293 at 58, 358 S.E.2d at 704 (footnote omitted).
30. See Geddis, _ S.C. at _, 437 S.E.2d at 33 (Finney, J., dissenting).
31. Id. at _, 437 S.E.2d at 32-33 (citing State v. Green, 306 S.C. 94, 409 S.E.2d 785
(1991), cert. denied, _ U.S. __, 112 S. Ct. 1566 (1992)).
32. State v. Grate, __ S.C. __ , 423 S.E.2d 119, 120 (1992) (citing State V. Patterson,
307 S.C. 180, 414 S.E.2d 155 (1992); State v. Davis, 306 S.C. 246, 411 S.E.2d 200 (1991)).
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attended a previous trial. 3 Therefore, although slight, some evidence existed
in the record to support the trial judge's finding.
The dissent points correctly out that a reason racially neutral on its face
"may be invalidated or rendered a sham by failing to apply the reason in a
neutral manner."34 Moreover, the solicitor's reason for striking the black
woman was: "'I try to avoid putting women especially that young on my
juries.'"" Initially it appears that the court should have invalidated the
solicitor's race-neutral reason for the solicitor's not applying it neutrally.
However, some evidence existed that there was a sufficient distinction between
the white jurors and the black juror to satisfy the Batson inquiry. The
dissent's most compelling point is that the white jurors said nothing on the
record to support the solicitor's theory that they were more interested than the
black juror.36 While this point may distinguish Geddis from Wilder, it does
not overcome the great deference that appellate courts afford the trial judge's
determination. Although the white jurors in Geddis did not themselves speak
to their interest, the solicitor must articulate a race-neutral reason for the
peremptory strikes. The solicitor stated that the great interest the white jurors
showed in watching another trial overcame his reluctance to place them on the
jury.37 Obviously, the trial judge believed the solicitor's statement.
In all Batson hearings, seldom will there be much evidence concerning
whether the court should believe the counsel's explanation for peremptory
strikes. The best evidence likely will be the "'demeanor of the attorney who
exercises the challenge.'" 38 For this reason, giving great deference to the
trial judge's determination of the credibility of the solicitor makes sense.
In his Batson concurrence, Justice Marshall stated his belief that
peremptory challenges inject racial discrimination into the jury selection
process. In Marshall's view, the only way to stop this discrimination would
be to eliminate peremptory challenges altogether. 39 However, the Supreme
Court has not decided to follow this course. Instead, the Court used an
implicit balancing test to determine when to protect the right to an impartial
jury and when to protect the right to be free from invidious discrimination.'
In the case of racial discrimination, the court comes down firmly on the side
of protecting the right of parties and jurors to be free from discrimination in
33. See Geddis, _ S.C. at _, 437 S.E.2d at 32.
34. Geddis, _ S.C. at _, 437 S.E.2d at 33 (Finney, J., dissenting) (citing State v.
Oglesby, 298 S.C. 279, 379 S.E.2d 891 (1989)).
35. Id. at __, 437 S.E.2d at 32.
36. See id. at _, 437 S.E.2d at 34 (Finney, J., dissenting).
37. Id. at _, 437 S.E.2d at 32.
38. State v. Green, 306 S.C. 94, 97, 409 S.E.2d 785, 787 (quoting Hernandez v. New York,
500 U.S. 352, 365 (1991); cert. denied, __ U.S. _, 112 S. Ct. 1566 (1992)).
39. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 98, 103 (1986) (Marshall, J., concurring).
40. Prior, supra note 18, at 594.
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jury selection. 4'  The Court essentially eliminated the true peremptory
challenge in cases dealing with possible racial discrimination. The extent to
which the Court will limit the use of peremptory challenges with regard to
other classifications remains largely unanswered. The fear that Justice Burger
expressed in his dissent in Batson that "defendants could object to exclusions
on the basis of not only race, but also sex, age, religious or political
affiliation, mental capacity, number of children, living arrangements, and
employment in a particular industry, or profession" 42 has not come to full
fruition. However, the Supreme Court recently held that "gender, like race,
is an unconstitutional proxy for juror competence and impartiality.
'4 3
Because race is a suspect classification, it receives strict constitutional
scrutiny. 4" With the recently established exception of gender, courts do not
give other classifications the same intense scrutiny.45 Therefore, the
peremptory challenge may well retain its vitality outside the realm of racial
and gender discrimination.
Nonetheless, problems remain for the application of the Court's various
Batson-related decisions. The usual lack of evidence of the striking party's
intent, the possibility of a striking party developing race-neutral rationales to
cover race-based peremptory challenges, and the possible injection of racial
issues into the jury selection process46 all are problems that courts and
practitioners still face. Practitioners should remain aware of the possibility of
a Batson challenge and should prepare to explain their race-neutral decisions
to the court. Courts should give a Batson hearing whenever members of a
cognizable racial group are struck from the panel of eligible jurors.
In Geddis the South Carolina Supreme Court merely followed the dictates
of Batson and its progeny. Because the solicitor could articulate to the trial
judge's satisfaction a race-neutral reason for striking the black female juror
and then distinguish between her and the two white female jurors, the court
had to affirm Geddis' conviction. Although the support in the record for the
trial judge's decision was slight, it was present. Therefore, although the
dissent presented a strong argument for remanding the case for a new trial, the
majority correctly decided to affirm. Practitioners always should be ready to
explain their race-neutral decisions in using peremptory strikes. Also,
41. See supra notes 19-21 and accompanying text; see also Prior, supra note 18, at 594-95
("In conducting this balance, the Court clearly expressed its judgment: with regard to racial
stereotypes, the equal protection clause trumps the peremptory challenge.").
42. Batson, 476 U.S. at 124 (Burger, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
43. J.E.B. v. Alabama, _ U.S. _, _, 114 S.Ct. 1419, 1421 (1994).
44. Prior, supra note 18, at 596.
45. See id. at 596-97 ("Other classifications such as age, level of education, or occupation
receive only low level scrutiny .... ") (footnote omitted).
46. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 129 (1986) (Burger, J., dissenting).
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practitioners should be ready to call for a Batson hearing whenever the other
party uses peremptory strikes against a cognizable racial group. Finally,
practitioners should be aware of the possibility of the expansion of the Batson
holding to include other cognizable groups. While it's unlikely that the Court
will extend Batson to eliminate peremptory challenges entirely, courts may
allow the peremptory challenge to erode slowly until it is merely a shadow of
its former self.
Shane E. Swanson
III. SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION RULING
REMAINS IMMEDIATELY APPEALABLE
In Woodard v. Westvaco Corp.' the South Carolina Court of Appeals
held that the proper procedure for raising lack of subject matter jurisdiction
is a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.2 The court
further held that even if the motion is made in the form of a motion for
summary judgment,3 the circuit court should treat the motion as a motion to
dismiss.4 More importantly, the court reaffirmed the rule that the denial of
such a motion is immediately appealable.5 Before following South Carolina
precedent, 6 the court questioned the procedural practice in light of the
supreme court's recent holding in Mid-State Distributors v. Century Import-
ers.7 The court explained that, but for subsequent decisions of the supreme
court on these interlocutory appeals,' it was prepared to apply the supreme
court's reasoning in Mid-State to hold that the denial of the motion to dismiss
1. _ S.C. _, 433 S.E.2d 890 (Ct. App. 1993), cert. granted, (Apr. 8, 1994).
2. S.C. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1).
3. S.C. R. Civ. P. 56.
4. See Woodard, _ S.C. at _, 433 S.E.2d at 891-92 (citing Prakash v. American Univ.,
727 F.2d 1174 (D.C. Cir. 1984)).
5. The court of appeals stated that the appeal presented two issues: "(1) Is an order denying
a motion for summary judgment on the ground of lack of subject matter jurisdictionan appealable
order? (2) Did the judge err as a matter of law in failing to rule that Woodard was a statutory
employee?"
6. See Simms v. Phillips, 46 S.C. 149, 151, 24 S.E. 97, 98 (1896) (holding that a denial of
a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is immediately appealable); see also
Carter v. Florentine Corp., _ S.C. _, _ n.1, 423 S.E.2d 112, 113 n.1 (1992) (citing
Simms, 46 S.C. at 149,24 S.E. at 97), overruledby Ballenger v. Bowen, 443 S.E.2d 379 (1994).
7. _ S.C. _, _, 426 S.E.2d 777, 781 (1993) (holding that the denial of a Rule 12(b)
(2) motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction is not immediately appealable).
8. See Timms v. Greene, _ S.C. _, _, 427 S.E.2d 642, 642 (1993) (affirming the trial
court's denial of a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction); Duncan v. Provident
Mut. Life Ins. Co., _ S.C. _, _, 427 S.E.2d 657, 658 (1993) (disagreeing with the
appellant's assertion that the trial court incorrectly denied the appellant's Rule 12(b) (1) motion).
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for lack of subject matter jurisdiction was not immediately appealable.' These
rulings compelled the court to reverse the trial court's denial of summary
judgment and conclude that the judge should have dismissed the case. ,0
In Woodard, Woodard sued Westvaco seeking damages for personal
injuries. Woodard was a driver for Southern Bulk Haulers, which had
contracted to transport "black liquor"" for Westvaco.' 2 Usually, Westvaco
stored the black liquor on site in its own storage tanks. However, due to an
outage, Westvaco contracted with Exxon to lease off-site storage tanks to avoid
shutting down production.'" While Woodard loaded the black liquor into the
tanker truck, a pressurized hose broke, spraying him with hot liquid and
knocking him from the top of his truck to the pavement.14 Woodard based
this suit on the resulting injuries.'
5
Westvaco moved for summary judgment claiming that because Woodard
was a statutory employee,' 6 Workers' Compensation law provided his
exclusive remedy. 7 Therefore, Westvaco argued, the court lacked subject
matter jurisdiction to hear the claim. The circuit court denied Westvaco's
motion stating that, viewed in the light most favorable to Woodard, whether
Woodard was a statutory employee was a genuine issue of material fact. The
court of appeals reversed the trial court's denial of summary judgment and
remanded. 1
The court determined the appealability of an interlocutory order denying
a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction) 9 The court noted,
9. See Woodard, _ S.C. at __, 433 S.E.2d at 892-94.
10. See id. at _, 433 S.E.2d at 895.
11. Black liquor is a byproduct of Westvaco's manufacturing process from which the
expensive manufacturing chemicals are recovered and reused. Id. at _, 433 S.E.2d at 894.
12. Id. at _, 433 S.E.2d at 891.
13. Id. at -, 433 S.E.2d at 894.
14. Woodard, _ S.C. at _, 433 S.E.2d at 891.
15. See id. at , 433 S.E.2d at 891.
16. S.C. CODE ANN. § 42-1-400 (Law. Co-op. 1985), (quoted in Woodard, _ S.C. at_,
433 S.E.2d at 894, states:
When any person ... undertakes to perform or execute any work which is a part of
his trade, business or occupation and contracts with any other person ... for the execution
or performance ... of the whole or any part of the work undertaken..., the owner shall
be liable to pay to any workman employed in the work any compensation under this Title
which he would have been liable to pay if the workman had been immediately employed
by him.
17. S.C. CODE ANN. § 42-1-540 (Law. Co-op. 1985) states:
The rights and remedies granted by this Title to an employee when he and his
employer have accepted the provisions of this Title, respectively, to pay and accept
compensation on account of personal injury or death by accident, shall exclude all other
rights and remedies of such employee . . . as against his employer, at common law or
otherwise, on account of such injury, loss of service or death.
18. Woodard, _ S.C. at _, 433 S.E.2d at 891.
19. Id. at _, 433 S.E.2d at 891. This article focuses on the appealability issue. Notably,
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"The proper procedure for raising lack of subject matter jurisdiction prior to
trial is to file a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b) (1), SCRCP, rather
than a motion for~summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56, SCRCP." ° The
reasoning involves the distinction between the two motions. "[Summary
judgment is an adjudication of the merits of the case .... "21 A motion to
dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is "a question of law for the
court. .... Accordingly, the court should have decided the question of its own
jurisdiction on the facts before it" as a matter of law.'
Further, the court concluded that an interlocutory order denying a motion
to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is immediately appealable.'
The court reached this conclusion after explaining that the South Carolina rule,
which permits immediate appeal,' is contrary to that employed in the federal
court system and in North Carolina.2 The supreme court's holding in Mid-
State, recognizing that a denial of a motion to dismiss for lack of personal
jurisdiction26 is not immediately appealable,27 occasioned the court's lengthy
review of the law on this point. The court explained, "The reasoning in Mid-
State is even more compelling when applied to the denial of a motion to
dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b) (1). "2 The
court explained the two rationales offered by the supreme court:
(1) Denial of the motion to dismiss did not "involve the merits," which the
Court defined as "an order which 'must finally determine some substantial
matter forming the whole or a part of some cause of action or defense.'"
The Court specifically overruled an 1886 case and an 1890 case, both of
which had allowed an immediate appeal from motions to dismiss for lack
of personal jurisdiction. The Court said these cases were outdated,
because they were decided when the definition of "involving the merits"
however, the court articulated the test for whether an activity is that of a statutory employee. As
evidenced by the parties' briefs and the Petition for Certiorari, this test's application previously
was disputed. See infra note 33.
20. Id. at-, 433 S.E.2d at 891-92. Following Prakash v. American University, 727 F.2d
1174 (D.C. Cir 1984), the court stated that a court should treat a Rule 56 motion as a Rule 12(b)
(1) motion. Woodard, __ S.C. at _, 433 S.E.2d at 892.
21. Woodard, _ S.C. at __, 433 S.E.2d at 892.
22. Id. at, 433 S.E.2d at 892 (citing Bridges v. Wyandotte Worsted Co., 243 S.C. 1, 132
S.E.2d 18 (1963)).
23. Id. at __, 433 S.E.2d at 894.
24. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
25. Woodard, _ S.C. at _, 433 S.E.2d at 892. As noted by the court, South Carolina
and North Carolina modelled their rules of procedure on the Federal Rules and adopted
provisions identical to FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b) (1). See id. at 433 S.E.2d at 892.9
26. S.C. R. Civ. P. 12(b) (2).
27. Mid-State Distrib. v. Century Importers, _ S.C. , _,426 S.E.2d 777, 781 (1993).
28. Woodard, _ S.C. at _, 433 S.E.2d at 893.
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was much broader. (2) The Court also reasoned the denial did not
prejudice the defendant, but rather simply required him to proceed to trial
where he could later prevail on the jurisdictional issue. It stated the
appellant had "not arrived at the end of the road."29
Despite the court's doubt as to the vitality of the South Carolina rule, the
supreme court's posture compelled the court of appeals to follow the rule
seemingly applied by the supreme court.30 The supreme court has continued
to hear interlocutory appeals of orders denying motions to dismiss for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction.31 Therefore, the court held that the denial of the
motion in this case is immediately appealable.
Applying these procedural rules to the facts, the court found that Woodard
was a statutory employee and that Workers' Compensation provided his
exclusive remedy.32 Undisputedly the "recovery, storage, and reprocessing
of 'black liquor'" and the "maintenance and repair of manufacturing
equipment" are "ordinary and necessary part[s] of Westvaco's paper
manufacturing business. These activities are normally performed on site by
Westvaco's employees."" Because doubts are resolved in favor of including
workers and their employers under Workers' Compensation law.34 The court
analogized these facts with those of "the leading case of Marchbanks v. Duke
Power Co. "3 The court ruled that the trial court should have found as a
29. Id. at __,433 S.E.2d at 893.
30. See S.C. CONST. art. V, § 9; American Fast Print Ltd. v. Design Prints, 288 S.C. 46,
47, 339 S.E.2d 516, 517 (Ct. App. 1986) (citing Bain v. Self Memorial Hosp., 281 S.C. 138,
314 S.E.2d 603 (Ct. App. 1984).
31. See cases cited supra note 8.
32. Woodard, _ S.C. at _, 433 S.E.2d at 895 (citing Cook v. Mack's Transfer &
Storage, 291 S.C. 84, 352 S.E.2d 296 (Ct. App. 1986), cert. denied, 292 S.C. 230, 355 S.E.2d
861 (1987)).
33. Id. at __, 433 S.E.2d at 895. The three factors considered to determine if the activity
is that of a statutory employee are: "(1) whethet the activity is an important part of the trade or
business; (2) whether the activity is a necessary, essential, and integral part of the trade, business
or occupation; and (3) whether the activity has been performed by employees of the principal
employer." Id. at __, 433 S.E.2d at 894 (citing Boone v. Huntington & Guerry Elec., _ S.C.
_, 430 S.E.2d 507 (1993) (dictum); (Smith v. T.H. Snipes & Sons, Inc., 306 S.C. 289, 411
S.E.2d 439 (1991)). The court expressly stated that only one of these factors is required. Id. at
_, 433 S.E.2d at 894 (citing Bailey v. Owen Elec. Steel Co., 298 S.C. 36, 378 S.E.2d 63 (Ct.
App. 1989), rev'd on other grounds, 301 S.C. 399, 392 S.E.2d 186 (1990) (per curiam)).
Woodard's petition for certiorari is based on this issue. See supra note 5. Woodard claims that
the test in Boone is cumulative. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 4.
34. Revels v. Hoechst Celanese Corp., 301 S.C. 316, 318, 391 S.E.2d 731, 732 (Ct. App.
1990) (citing Adams v. Davison-Paxon Co., 230 S.C. 532, 96 S.E.2d 566 (1957)).
35. 190 S.C. 336, 2 S.E.2d 825 (1939) (holding that an employee of Duke Power's
independent contractor was a statutory employee and, therefore, precluded from bringing a civil
suit for on the job injuries). Woodard, _ S.C. at __, 433 S.E.2d at 895.
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matter of law that Woodard was a statutory employee whose sole remedy "was
to file a claim with the Workers' Compensation Commission."36 Therefore,
the circuit court had no jurisdiction to hear the action.37
The lengthy analysis included by the court of appeals in Woodard begs the
question of how the supreme court would resolve the issue of the appealability
of an interlocutory order denying a motion to dismiss for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction.3" The supreme court's ruling probably will result from
its determination of whether the issues raised by motions to dismiss for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction are distinguishable. The
motions have differences, such as whether one may waive jurisdiction and the
timeliness required for a motion, and similarities, such as the necessity of a
new trial upon reversal of such a motion.39 However, in Woodard the
opinion of the court of appeals suggests that no logical distinction between the
reasoning of the rules regarding appealability of orders denying motions to
dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and those regarding personal
jurisdiction exists. -
Depending on the supreme court's determination of whether these
jurisdictional issues can be distinguished, there are at least two alternatives.40
First, the court could apply stare decisis and continue to hold that such
interlocutory orders are immediately appealable. Second, the court could
follow federal and North Carolina precedents and apply the reasoning of Mid-
State,41 ruling that such interlocutory orders are not immediately appealable.
The federal courts primarily follow a "final judgment rule,"42 allowing
appeals only after a final judgment, except where the order involves a
"controlling question of law" from which an appeal "may materially advance
the ultimate termination of the litigation. "'
The first option provides for the theoretical stability inherent in stare
decisis. Practically, "where substantial rights are determined by an interlocu-
tory order or where protracted and costly proceedings are dependent on these
orders, postponing review until there has been a final adjudication works an
36. Id. at__, 433 S.E.2d at 895 (citing Cook, 291 S.C. at 84, 352 S.E.2d at 296).
37. Id. at _,433 S.E.2d at 895 (citing Cook, 291 S.C. at 84, 352 S.E.2d at 296).
38. Woodard petitioned the supreme court for certiorari, but not on the procedural question
addressed in this survey. See supra note 5.
39. See generally 5A CHARLES A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 1351 (1990) (discussing courts' general confusion and misdesignation of subject
matter and personal jurisdiction).
40. The two alternatives will be discussed below, but an extensive review of the alternatives
is beyond the scope of this survey.
41. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
42. See Theodore D. Frank, Comment, Requiem for the Final Judgment Rule, 45 TEx. L.
REv. 292, 294 (1966).
43. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1988).
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undue hardship on the litigants."' In cases like Woodard this position
protects defendants from having to mount a costly defense only to find that the
suit was meaningless.
In support of this alternative, the current procedure is sufficient. If a
motion to dismiss is made before trial, the court may: (1) rule on it
immediately; (2) hold a hearing on the issue; or (3) reserve judgment until an
appropriate ruling can be made.4" Further, if the supreme court believes the
appeal is inappropriate, it may refuse to hear the appeal. 46 These options
provide the supreme court with the flexibility and the discretion to hear the
cases it deems appropriate.
Arguably, the second alternative provides less flexibility to the appellate
courts in determining which interlocutory appeals deserve immediate
consideration. The North Carolina cases favorably cited by the court of
appeals hold that the denial of a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction is not immediately appealable.47 In Shaver 8 the court dismissed
the defendants' interlocutory appeal from the trial court's order denying their
motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The court reasoned:
The rule barring immediate appeals from such interlocutory orders serves
to eliminate the unnecessary delay and expense of repeated fragmentary
appeals and to present the whole case for determination in a single appeal
from the final judgment; permitting parties to bring cases to an appellate
court piecemeal through the medium of successive appeals from interme-
diate orders would effectively procrastinate the administration of justice.49
While the North Carolina court seems concerned with providing judicial
efficiency, its argument against fragmented appeals might justify further
consideration. The court discusses "successive appeals from intermediate
orders" as delaying the "administration of justice. " ° If successful, the
appeals warranted review and prevented costly and potentially meaningless
proceedings that would have ensued absent the interlocutory appeals.
Furthermore, while the North Carolina court relies on this policy argument,
the opinion appears equally based on the court's interpretation of the North
44. Frank, supra note 42, at 293 (citing Central Trust Co. v. Grant Locomotive Works, 135
U.S. 207 (1890)); 6 JAMEs W. MOORE ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE 54.19 (2d ed. 1953);
WRIGHT, supra note 39, 101.
45. See S.C. R. Civ. P. 12(d).
46. See S.C. APP. CT. R. 226(b).
47. See Woodard v. Westvaco Corp., - S.C. , __, 433 S.E.2d 890, 892 (Ct. App.
1993) (citing Teachy v. Coble Dairies, 293 S.E.2d 182 (N.C. 1982); Shaver v. North Carolina
Monroe Constr. Co., 283 S.E.2d 526 (N.C. Ct. App. 1981)), cert. granted, (Apr. 8, 1994).
48. 283 S.E.2d 526 (N.C.App. 1981).
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Carolina statute describing the appropriateness of an immediate appeal.51
Because South Carolina does not have a similar statute,52 the weight of this
public policy argument should be considered when contemplating such a rule.
While the federal approach might provide the flexibility an appellate court
would desire, it might also require substantial procedural and statutory
changes. Like the North Carolina approach, this alternative is also based on
the final judgment rule.53 In explaining the support behind the final judgment
rule, one commentator stated that
it effectuates, in general, an efficient utilization of judicial manpower and
permits the initial stage of litigation to operate in a smooth, orderly fashion
without disrupting appeals. By delaying review until there has been a final
disposition of the case, the rule precludes the harassment and avoids the
delay which incessant appeals from interlocutory orders entail. It also
provides the appellate courts with an overview of the case instead of the
limited perspective afforded by piecemeal appeals.... In the usual case,
where the litigation period is short and the legal design is relatively simple,
the advantages of the rule justify the slight harm caused by the delayed
review. In addition, the rule. lessens the burden on appellate dockets,
while preventing the subversion of trial court authority and respect which
frequent appellate intervention might produce.54
Despite the persuasive public policy argument for the final judgment rule,
this alternative deserves further consideration. For example, this commentator
appears concerned with potential harassment and delays. While a valid
concern, South Carolina Appellate Court Rule 240 can police any delays
resulting from an abuse of the process.55
Reading Judge Bell's opinion in Woodard, it seems that the court believes
the rule on the appealability of 12(b) (1) motions should be consistent with
Mid-State. However, Judge Bell's opinion possibly demonstrates that no
logical distinction can be drawn between the denial of a motion to dismiss for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction and for lack of personal jurisdiction. In this
scenario, the opinion may suggest that the supreme court should reconsider the
51. See id. at 527 (interpreting N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-277(b) (1971)); see also Teachy, 293
S.E.2d at 184 (citing Shaver, 283 S.E.2d at 526).
52. Cf. S.C. CODE ANN. § 14-3-330 (Law. Co-op. 1976 & Supp. 1993).
53. See Goldston v. American Motors Corp., 392 S.E.2d 735 (N.C. 1990) (discussing North
Carolina statutes setting forth the appeals process, which do not include the same jurisdictional
finality requirement as the federal statutes).
54. Frank, supra note 42, at 292-93 (footnotes omitted); see also Martin H. Redish, The
Pragmatic Approach to Appealability in the Federal Courts, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 89 (1975).
55. See S.C. APP. CT. R. 240 (authorizing the appellate courts to impose appropriate
sanctions on attorneys or parties who file an appeal petition, motion, or return that is frivolous
or filed for the sole purpose of delay).
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Mid-State decision and conclude that the denials of both 12(b) (1) and 12(b)
(2) motions are immediately appealable.
The court of appeals stated that courts should treat a motion for summary
judgment for lack of subject matter jurisdiction as a motion to dismiss under
Rule 12(b) (1).16 Furthermore, the court held that an order denying a motion
to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction was immediately appeal-
able. 7 Because of the inconsistency between Woodard and Mid-State, the
Supreme Court probably will develop a consistent rule for the appeals of
interlocutory denials of 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(2) motions or will enumerate how
these motions are distinguishable.
J. Hagood Tighe
56. See Woodard v. Westvaco Corp., _ S.C. _, _, 433 S.E.2d 890, 892 (Ct. App.
1993) (citing Prakash v. American Univ., 727 F.2d 1174 (D.C. Cir. 1934)), cert. granted,
(Apr. 8, 1994).
57. See id. at __, 433 S.E.2d at 894.
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